New Directions in Anonymization: Permutation Paradigm, Verifiability by
  Subjects and Intruders, Transparency to Users by Domingo-Ferrer, Josep & Muralidhar, Krishnamurty
New Directions in Anonymization: Permutation
Paradigm, Verifiability by Subjects and Intruders,
Transparency to Users
Josep Domingo-Ferrer∗and Krishnamurty Muralidhar†
March 12, 2018
Abstract
There are currently two approaches to anonymization: “utility first”
(use an anonymization method with suitable utility features, then em-
pirically evaluate the disclosure risk and, if necessary, reduce the risk by
possibly sacrificing some utility) or “privacy first” (enforce a target pri-
vacy level via a privacy model, e.g., k-anonymity or ε-differential privacy,
without regard to utility). To get formal privacy guarantees, the sec-
ond approach must be followed, but then data releases with no utility
guarantees are obtained. Also, in general it is unclear how verifiable is
anonymization by the data subject (how safely released is the record she
has contributed?), what type of intruder is being considered (what does
he know and want?) and how transparent is anonymization towards the
data user (what is the user told about methods and parameters used?).
We show that, using a generally applicable reverse mapping transfor-
mation, any anonymization for microdata can be viewed as a permutation
plus (perhaps) a small amount of noise; permutation is thus shown to be
the essential principle underlying any anonymization of microdata, which
allows giving simple utility and privacy metrics. From this permutation
paradigm, a new privacy model naturally follows, which we call (d,v)-
permuted privacy. The privacy ensured by this method can be verified
by each subject contributing an original record (subject-verifiability) and
also at the data set level by the data protector. We then proceed to define
a maximum-knowledge intruder model, which we argue should be the one
considered in anonymization. Finally, we make the case for anonymiza-
tion transparent to the data user, that is, compliant with Kerckhoff’s
assumption (only the randomness used, if any, must stay secret).
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1 Introduction
In the information society, public administrations and enterprises are increas-
ingly collecting, exchanging and releasing large amounts of sensitive and het-
erogeneous information on individual subjects. Typically, a small fraction of
these data is made available to the general public (open data) for the purposes
of improving transparency, planning, business opportunities and general well-
being. Other data sets are released only to scientists for research purposes, or
exchanged among companies [4].
Privacy is a fundamental right included in Article 12 of the Universal Dec-
laration of Human Rights. However, if privacy is understood as seclusion [30],
it is hardly compatible with the information society and with current pervasive
data collection. A more realistic notion of privacy in our time is informational
self-determination. This right was mentioned for the first time in a German
constitutional ruling dated 15 Dec. 1983 as “the capacity of the individual to
determine in principle the disclosure and use of his/her personal data” and it
also underlies the classical privacy definition by [31].
Privacy legislation in most developed countries forbids releasing and/or ex-
changing data that are linkable to individual subjects (re-identification disclo-
sure) or allow inferences on individual subjects (attribute disclosure). Hence, in
order to forestall any disclosure on individual subjects, data that are intended
for release and/or exchange should first undergo a process of data anonymiza-
tion, sanitization, or statistical disclosure control (e.g., see [14] for a reference
work).
Statistical disclosure control (SDC) takes care of respondent/subject privacy
by anonymizing three types of outputs: tabular data, interactive databases and
microdata files. Microdata files consist of records each of which contains data
about one individual subject (person, enterprise, etc.) and the other two types
of output can be derived from microdata. Hence, we will focus on microdata.
The usual setting in microdata SDC is for a data protector (often the same
entity that owns and releases the data) to hold the original data set (with the
original responses by the subjects) and modify it to reduce the disclosure risk.
There are two approaches for disclosure risk control in SDC:
• Utility first. An anonymization method with a heuristic parameter choice
and with suitable utility preservation properties1 is run on the microdata
set and, after that, the risk of disclosure is measured. For instance, the
1It is very difficult, if not impossible, to assess utility preservation for all potential analyses
that can be performed on the data. Hence, by utility preservation we mean preservation of
some preselected target statistics (for example means, variances, correlations, classifications
or even some model fitted to the original data that should be preserved by the anonymized
data).
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risk of re-identification can be estimated empirically by attempting record
linkage between the original and the anonymized data sets (see [29]), or
analytically by using generic measures (e.g., [15]) or measures tailored to a
specific anonymization method (e.g., [10] for sampling). If the extant risk
is deemed too high, the anonymization method must be re-run with more
privacy-stringent parameters and probably with more utility sacrifice.
• Privacy first. In this case, a privacy model is enforced with a parameter
that guarantees an upper bound on the re-identification disclosure risk
and perhaps also on the attribute disclosure risk. Model enforcement is
achieved by using a model-specific anonymization method with parameters
that derive from the model parameters. Well-known privacy models in-
clude ε-differential privacy [8], ε-indistinguishability [9], k-anonymity [24]
and the extensions of the latter taking care of attribute disclosure, like
l-diversity [18], t-closeness [16], (n, t)-closeness [17], crowd-blending pri-
vacy [13] and others. If the utility of the resulting anonymized data is too
low, then the privacy model in use should be enforced with a less strict
privacy parameter or even replaced by a different privacy model.
1.1 Diversity of anonymization principles
Anonymization methods for microdata rely on a diversity of principles, and this
makes it difficult to analytically compare their utility and data protection prop-
erties [7]; this is why one usually resorts to empirical comparisons [5]. A first
high-level distinction is between data masking and synthetic data generation.
Masking generates a modified version Y of the original data microdata set X,
and it can be perturbative masking (Y is a perturbed version of the original
microdata set X) or non-perturbative masking (Y is obtained from X by partial
suppressions or reduction of detail, yet the data in Y are still true). Synthetic
data are artificial (i.e. simulated) data Y that preserve some preselected prop-
erties of the original data X. The vast majority of anonymization methods are
global methods, in that a data protector with access to the full original data set
applies the method and obtains the anonymized data set. There exist, however,
local perturbation methods, in which the subjects do not need to trust anyone
and can anonymize their own data (e.g., [22, 26]).
1.2 Shortcomings related to subjects, intruders and users
We argue that current anonymization practice does not take the informational
self-determination of the subject into account. Since in most cases the data
releaser is held legally responsible for the anonymization (for example, this hap-
pens in official statistics), the releaser favors global anonymization methods,
where he can make all choices (methods, parameters, privacy and utility lev-
els, etc.). When supplying their data, the subjects must hope there will be
a data protector who will adequately protect their privacy in case of release.
Whereas this hope may be reasonable for government surveys, it may be less
3
so for private surveys (customer satisfaction surveys, loyalty program question-
naires, social network profiles, etc.). Indeed, a lot of privately collected data
sets end up in the hands of data brokers [11], who trade with them with lit-
tle or no anonymization. Hence, there is a fundamental mismatch between the
kind of subject privacy (if any) offered by data releasers/protectors and privacy
understood as informational self-determination.
The intruder model is also a thorny issue in anonymization. In the utility-
first approach and in privacy models belonging to the k-anonymity family, re-
strictive assumptions are made on the amount of background knowledge avail-
able to the intruder for re-identification. Assuming that a generic intruder knows
this but not that is often rather arbitrary. In the ε-differential privacy model,
no restrictions are placed on the intruder’s knowledge; the downside is that, to
protect against re-identification by such an intruder, the original data set must
be perturbed to an extent such that the presence or absence of any particular
original record becomes unnoticeable in the anonymized data set. How to deal
with an unrestricted intruder incurring as little utility damage as possible is an
open issue.
Another unresolved debate is how much detail shall or can be given to the
user on the masking methods and parameters used to anonymize a data re-
lease [2]. Whereas the user would derive increased inferential utility from learn-
ing as much as possible on how anonymization was performed, for some methods
such details might result in disclosure of original data. Thus, even though Ker-
ckhoff’s principle is considered a golden rule in data encryption (encryption and
decryption algorithms must be public and the only secret parameter must be
the key), it is still far from being achieved/accepted in data anonymization.
1.3 Contribution and plan of this paper
We first give in Section 2 a procedure that, for any anonymization method,
allows mapping the anonymized attribute values back to the original attribute
values, thereby preserving the marginal distributions of original attributes (re-
verse mapping).
Based on reverse mapping, we show in Section 3 that any anonymization
method for microdata can be regarded as a permutation that may be supple-
mented by a small noise addition (permutation paradigm). Permutation is thus
shown to be the essential principle underlying any anonymization of microdata,
which allows giving simple utility and privacy metrics that can also be used to
compare methods with each other.
From the permutation paradigm, a new privacy model naturally follows,
which we present in Section 4 under the name (d,v)-permuted privacy. Like all
other privacy models, this model can be verified by the data protector for the
entire original data set. A more attractive feature is that the subject contributing
each original record can verify to what extent the privacy guarantee of the model
holds for her record (subject-verifiability). Note that subject-verifiability is a
major step towards informational self-determination, because it gives the subject
control on how her data have been anonymized (a property that has also been
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called intervenability [23]).
Then in Section 5 we introduce a maximum-knowledge intruder model, which
makes any assumptions about background knowledge unnecessary. We de-
scribe how such an intruder can optimally guess the correspondence between
anonymized and original records and how he can assess the accuracy of his
guess. Further, we show how to protect against such a powerful intruder by
using anonymization methods that provide an adequate level of permutation.
Finally, in Section 6 we make the case for anonymization transparent to the
data user. Just as Kerckhoff’s assumption is the guiding principle in data en-
cryption, it should be adopted in anonymization: good anonymization methods
should remain safe when everything (anonymized data, original data, anonymiza-
tion method and parameters) except the anonymization key (randomness used)
is published.
We illustrate all concepts introduced with a running example. Finally, con-
clusions and future research directions are gathered in Section 7.
2 Reverse mapping of anonymized data
We next recall a reverse-mapping procedure, which we first gave in the confer-
ence paper [20] in another context. Let X = {x1, x2, · · · , xn} the values taken
by attribute X in the original data set. Let Y = {y1, y2, · · · , yn} represent the
anonymized version of X. We make no assumptions about the anonymization
method used to generate Y , but we assume that the values in both X and Y
can be ranked in some way2; any ties in them are broken randomly. Knowledge
of X and Y allows deriving another set of values Z via reverse mapping, as per
Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Reverse-mapping conversion
Require: Original attribute X = {x1, x2, · · · , xn}
Require: Anonymized attribute Y = {y1, y2, · · · , yn}
for i = 1 to n do
Compute j = Rank(yi)
Set zi = x(j) (where x(j) is the value of X of rank j)
end for
return Z = {z1, z2, · · · , zn}
Releasing the reverse-mapped attribute Z instead of Y has a number of
advantages:
• By construction, each reverse-mapped attribute preserves the rank cor-
relation between the corresponding anonymized attribute and the rest of
2 For numerical or categorical ordinal attributes, ranking is straightforward. Even for
categorical nominal attributes, the ranking assumption is less restrictive than it appears,
because semantic distance metrics are available that can be used to rank them (for instance,
the marginality distance in [6, 27]).
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attributes in the data set; hence, reverse mapping does not damage the
rank correlation structure of the original data set more than the underly-
ing anonymization method.
• In fact, Z incurs less information loss than Y since Z preserves the marginal
distribution of the original attribute X.
• Disclosure risk can be conveniently measured by the rank order correlation
between X and Z (the higher, the more risk).
In Table 1 we give a running example. The original data set consists of three
attributes X1, X2 and X3 which have been generated by sampling N(100, 102),
N(1000, 502) and N(5000, 2002) distributions, respectively. The masked data
set consists of three attributes Y 1, Y 2 and Y 3 obtained, respectively, from
X1, X2 and X3 by noise addition. The noise E1 added to X1 was sampled
from a N(0, 52), the noise E2 added to X2 from a N(0, 252) and the noise E3
added to X3 from a N(0, 1002). The reverse-mapped attributes obtained using
Algorithm 1 are Z1, Z2 and Z3, respectively.
In Table 1 we also give the ranks of values for the original and masked at-
tributes, so that Algorithm 1 can be verified on the table. By way of illustration,
consider the first attribute of the the first record. For the first original record,
X1 = 103.69. This value turns out to be the 10th value of X1 sorted in in-
creasing order. After adding noise to X1 = 103.69, we get the masked value
Y 1 = 108.18, which is the 14th value of Y 1 sorted in increasing order. Then,
to do the reverse mapping, we replace Y 1 = 108.18 by the 14th value of X1
(108.21) and we get Z1 = 108.21.
Clearly the values of each Zj are a permutation of the values of the cor-
responding Xj , for j = 1, 2, 3. Hence, the reverse-mapped attributes preserve
the marginal distribution of the corresponding original attributes. The disclo-
sure risk can be measured by the rank correlations between X1 and Z1 (0.722),
between X2 and Z2 (0.844) and between X3 and Y 3 (0.776).
3 A permutation paradigm of anonymization
Reverse mapping has the following broader conceptual implication: any anonymiza-
tion method is functionally equivalent to a two-step procedure consisting of a
permutation step (mapping the original data set to the output of the reverse
mapping procedure in Algorithm 1) plus a noise addition step (adding the dif-
ference between the reverse-mapped output and the anonymized data set).
Specifically, take X to be the original data set, Y the anonymized data
set and Z the reverse-mapped data set (the values of each attribute in Z are
a permutation of the corresponding attribute in X). Now, conceptually, any
anonymization method is functionally equivalent to doing the following: i) per-
mute the original data set X to obtain Z; ii) add some noise to Z to obtain Y.
The noise used to transform Z into Y is necessarily small (residual) because
it cannot change any rank: note that, by the construction of Algorithm 1, the
ranks of corresponding values of Z and Y are the same.
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Table 1: Running example. Original data set, formed by attributes X1, X2 and
X3. Masked data set, formed by attributes Y 1, Y 2 and Y 3 obtained via noise
addition. Reverse-mapped data set, formed by attributes Z1, Z2 and Z3. The
notation (Xj) stands for the ranks of the values of Xj . Analogously for (Y j).
X1 X2 X3 (X1) (X2) (X3) Y 1 Y 2 Y 3 (Y 1) (Y 2) (Y 3) Z1 Z2 Z3
103.69 981.80 4928.80 10 8 8 108.18 972.62 4876.73 14 7 5 108.21 980.97 4893.50
93.13 980.97 4931.16 2 7 9 96.60 1020.73 5005.04 6 11 13 96.18 988.44 4986.25
100.87 902.21 5108.54 9 1 15 105.26 882.92 4900.68 13 1 7 107.62 902.21 4905.71
95.24 953.37 5084.18 4 4 14 88.02 944.54 4949.78 2 4 10 93.13 953.37 4941.81
96.18 1086.34 5212.25 6 20 18 91.57 1057.83 5267.57 5 18 19 95.50 1052.34 5232.96
93.16 986.70 5232.96 3 10 19 100.41 991.34 5230.64 8 9 18 99.72 984.87 5212.25
95.50 952.13 4824.95 5 3 3 100.31 959.89 4824.03 7 5 4 98.99 971.09 4835.05
115.53 988.44 5437.43 19 11 20 123.37 1061.23 5450.70 20 19 20 116.75 1057.63 5437.43
98.99 941.48 4835.05 7 2 4 103.12 903.25 4752.03 10 2 3 103.69 941.48 4824.95
109.96 984.87 4950.48 16 9 11 104.82 912.77 4997.61 12 3 12 105.59 952.13 4954.28
99.72 1005.19 5158.64 8 13 17 87.83 1025.01 5166.63 1 12 17 87.62 990.58 5158.64
116.75 1057.63 4986.25 20 19 13 112.21 1082.43 4988.44 15 20 11 109.81 1086.34 4950.48
107.62 1025.13 4954.28 13 15 12 114.29 988.93 4889.75 17 8 6 110.63 981.80 4900.79
87.62 1031.74 4905.71 1 17 7 90.83 1049.58 4902.04 4 15 8 95.24 1025.13 4928.80
109.81 971.09 4941.81 15 5 10 113.64 1002.19 5020.71 16 10 14 109.96 986.70 5084.18
110.63 1052.34 4495.19 17 18 1 103.07 1052.03 4519.26 9 17 1 100.87 1031.74 4495.19
113.76 972.20 4893.50 18 6 5 117.00 962.84 5087.90 19 6 16 115.53 972.20 5143.05
105.59 1027.64 5143.05 12 16 16 89.43 1049.97 5072.79 3 16 15 93.16 1027.64 5108.54
108.21 990.58 4714.76 14 12 2 115.79 1036.10 4662.73 18 13 2 113.76 1005.19 4714.76
104.74 1023.96 4900.79 11 14 6 104.00 1037.00 4931.99 11 14 9 104.74 1023.96 4931.16
Let us emphasize that the functional equivalence described in the previous
paragraph does not imply any actual change in the anonymization method: we
are simply saying that the way the method transforms X into Y could be exactly
mimicked by first permuting X and then adding residual noise.
In this light, it seems rather obvious that protection against re-identifica-
tion via record linkage comes from the permutation step in the above functional
equivalence: as justified above, the noise addition step in the equivalence does
not change any ranks, so any rank change must come from the permutation
step. Thus, any two anonymization methods can, however different their ac-
tual operating principles, be compared in terms of how much permutation they
achieve, that is, how much they modify ranks.
On the other hand, to permute, one must have access to the full data set or
at least a part of it. Hence, local perturbation methods, which operate locally by
adding noise to each record, cannot guarantee a prescribed permutation amount;
if they protect against re-identification, it is by means of “blind” noise addition,
which may be an overkill.
We illustrate the view of anonymization as permutation plus residual noise
on the running example (Table 2). First we permute each original attribute
Xj to obtain the corresponding Zj , for j = 1, 2, 3. Then we add the noise E′j
required to obtain Y j from the corresponding Zj , for i = 1, 2, 3. It can be
observed that, for j = 1, 2, 3, in general the values of |E′j | are substantially
smaller than those of |Ej | where Ej = Y j −Xj is the noise required to obtain
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Table 2: Running example. View of masking as permutation plus (small) noise.
Original attributes Xj are permuted to get Zj , for j = 1, 2, 3. Then noise E′j is
added to Zj to get Y j . In general, for j = 1, 2, 3, less noise is required to obtain
Y j from Zj than directly from Xj (compare the absolute values of columns E′j
and Ej).
X1 X2 X3 Z1 Z2 Z3 E′1 E′2 E′3 Y 1 Y 2 Y 3 E1 E2 E3
103.69 981.80 4928.80 108.21 980.97 4893.50 -0.03 -8.35 -16.77 108.18 972.62 4876.73 4.49 -9.18 -52.07
93.13 980.97 4931.16 96.18 988.44 4986.25 0.42 32.29 18.79 96.60 1020.73 5005.04 3.47 39.76 73.88
100.87 902.21 5108.54 107.62 902.21 4905.71 -2.36 -19.29 -5.03 105.26 882.92 4900.68 4.39 -19.29 -207.86
95.24 953.37 5084.18 93.13 953.37 4941.81 -5.11 -8.83 7.97 88.02 944.54 4949.78 -7.22 -8.83 -134.40
96.18 1086.34 5212.25 95.50 1052.34 5232.96 -3.93 5.49 34.61 91.57 1057.83 5267.57 -4.61 -28.51 55.32
93.16 986.70 5232.96 99.72 984.87 5212.25 0.69 6.47 18.39 100.41 991.34 5230.64 7.25 4.64 -2.32
95.50 952.13 4824.95 98.99 971.09 4835.05 1.32 -11.20 -11.02 100.31 959.89 4824.03 4.81 7.76 -0.92
115.53 988.44 5437.43 116.75 1057.63 5437.43 6.62 3.60 13.27 123.37 1061.23 5450.70 7.84 72.79 13.27
98.99 941.48 4835.05 103.69 941.48 4824.95 -0.57 -38.23 -72.92 103.12 903.25 4752.03 4.13 -38.23 -83.02
109.96 984.87 4950.48 105.59 952.13 4954.28 -0.77 -39.36 43.33 104.82 912.77 4997.61 -5.14 -72.10 47.13
99.72 1005.19 5158.64 87.62 990.58 5158.64 0.21 34.43 7.99 87.83 1025.01 5166.63 -11.89 19.82 7.99
116.75 1057.63 4986.25 109.81 1086.34 4950.48 2.40 -3.91 37.96 112.21 1082.43 4988.44 -4.54 24.80 2.19
107.62 1025.13 4954.28 110.63 981.80 4900.79 3.66 7.13 -11.04 114.29 988.93 4889.75 6.67 -36.20 -64.53
87.62 1031.74 4905.71 95.24 1025.13 4928.80 -4.41 24.45 -26.76 90.83 1049.58 4902.04 3.21 17.84 -3.67
109.81 971.09 4941.81 109.96 986.70 5084.18 3.68 15.49 -63.47 113.64 1002.19 5020.71 3.83 31.10 78.90
110.63 1052.34 4495.19 100.87 1031.74 4495.19 2.20 20.29 24.07 103.07 1052.03 4519.26 -7.56 -0.31 24.07
113.76 972.20 4893.50 115.53 972.20 5143.05 1.47 -9.36 -55.15 117.00 962.84 5087.90 3.24 -9.36 194.40
105.59 1027.64 5143.05 93.16 1027.64 5108.54 -3.73 22.33 -35.75 89.43 1049.97 5072.79 -16.16 22.33 -70.26
108.21 990.58 4714.76 113.76 1005.19 4714.76 2.03 30.91 -52.03 115.79 1036.10 4662.73 7.58 45.52 -52.03
104.74 1023.96 4900.79 104.74 1023.96 4931.16 -0.74 13.04 0.83 104.00 1037.00 4931.99 -0.74 13.04 31.20
Y j directly from Xj for j = 1, 2, 3.
4 A new subject-verifiable privacy model: (d,v)-
permuted privacy
In Section 3, we have argued that permutation can be regarded as the essential
principle of microdata anonymization. This suggests adopting a new privacy
model focusing on permutation. Note that no privacy model in the literature
considers permutation. Our proposal follows.
Definition 1 ((d,v)-permuted privacy w.r.t. a record) Given a non-negative
integer d and an m-dimensional vector v of non-negative real numbers, an
anonymized data set with m attributes is said to satisfy (d,v)-permuted privacy
with respect to original record x if,
1. The permutation distance for x is at least d in the following sense: given
the anonymized attribute values y1∗, · · · , ym∗ closest to the respective at-
tribute values of x, no anonymized record (y1p, · · · , ymp ) exists such that
the ranks of yjp and y
j
∗ differ less than d for all j = 1, · · · ,m.
8
2. For 1 ≤ j ≤ m, if yj∗ is the value of the anonymized j-th attribute Y j
closest to the value xj of the j-th attribute of x, and Sj(d) is the set of
values of the sorted Y j whose rank differs no more than d from yj∗’s rank,
then the variance of Sj(d) is greater than the j-th component of v.
Definition 2 ((d,v)-permuted privacy for a data set) An anonymized data
set is said to satisfy (d,v)-permuted privacy if it satisfies (d,v)-permuted privacy
with respect to all records in the original data set.
The permutation distance mentioned in the first condition of Definition 1
can be computed using Algorithm 2. A few comments on this algorithm follow:
• For every attribute Y j , the algorithm first determines the anonymized
value yj∗ closest to the original value xj of the subject. If the anonymization
is just a permutation without noise addition (either because the method
used involves only permutation or because the anonymized data set has
been reverse-mapped with Algorithm 1 using knowledge of the original
data set), then yj∗ = xj .
• The goal is to determine whether these most similar values yj∗ for 1 ≤ j ≤
m have been permuted far enough from each other in terms of ranks.
The condition on variances in Definition 1 ensures that there is enough di-
versity, similar to what l-diversity [18] adds to k-anonymity. Variances of non-
numerical attributes can be computed as described in [6].
Algorithm 2 Permutation distance computation for an original
record
Require: x = (x1, · · · , xm) {Original record containing m attribute values}
Require: Y = {(y1i , · · · , ymi ) : i = 1, · · · , n} {Anonymized data set containing
n records with m attributes Y 1, · · · , Y m}
for j = 1 to m do
Let yj∗ be the value of Y j closest to xj
Sort Y by Y j
Let (yj∗) be the rank (record no.) of y
j
∗ in the sorted Y
for i = 1 to n do
Let (yji ) be the rank of y
j
i in the sorted Y
end for
end for
Set d = 0
while @(y1p, · · · , ymp ) ∈ Y such that ∀j = 1, · · · ,m it holds that |(yjp) −
(yj∗)| ≤ d do
d = d + 1
end while
return permutation distance d
Let us give a numerical illustration of how Algorithm 2 works. Assume that
one wants to determine the permutation distance for the third original record
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of Table 2, that is, x3 =(x
1
3, x
2
3, x
3
3) =(100.87, 902.21, 5108.54). The algorithm
looks for the values of Y 1, Y 2 and Y 3 closest to x13, x
2
3 and x
3
3, respectively.
These are y1∗ = 100.41, y
2
∗ = 903.25 and y
3
∗ = 5087.90, shown in boxes in Table 3.
The ranks of these values are (y1∗) = 8, (y
2
∗) = 2 and (y
3
∗) = 16 (the reader can
find them boxed in colums (Y 1), (Y 2) and (Y 3) of Table 3). Then the algorithm
looks for the record (y1p, y
2
p, y
3
p) whose attribute ranks deviate minimally from
((y1∗), (y
2
∗), (y
3
∗)) = (8, 2, 16) (the rank deviations are shown in columns d
1, d2
and d3 of Table 3). This record turns out to be the 10th anonymized record
(shown in underlined boldface in Table 3) and its rank deviations from the
anonymized attribute values closest to the original attribute values are 4, 1, 4,
respectively. Hence, the permutation distance for the third original record is
d3 = max {4, 1, 4} = 4.
Regarding the condition on variances in Definition 1, we can compute the
variances of the three anonymized attributes restricted to the sets S1(4), S2(4)
and S3(4), respectively. For example
S1(4) = {96.60, 91.57, 100.41, 100.31, 103.12,
104.82, 90.83, 103.07, 104.00}
and the variance of the values of S1(4) is 24.70. Similarly, for S2(4) and S3(4)
the corresponding variances are 896.76 and 20167.78, respectively. Hence, the
anonymized data set in Table 3 satisfies (d,v)-permuted privacy with respect to
the third original record, with d = 4 and v = (24.70, 896.76, 20167.78).
We can perform the above computations not only for the third original
record, but for the entire original data set. We show the results in Table 4,
which gives:
• For each original record xi, the closest anonymized record yp and the
permutation distance;
• The data set-level permutation distance d (this is the minimum of the
record-level permutation distances);
• For each original record xi and each anonymized attribute Y j , the variance
of Sji (d) and (between parentheses) the variance of S
j
i (di), where d is the
data set-level permutation distance (d = 1) and di is the record-level
permutation distance;
• For each anonymized attribute, the data set-level minimum variance of
the attribute values whose rank deviates no more than d from the corre-
sponding attribute value of the anonymized record closest to the original
record (this is the minimum of the variances of Sji (d)).
From the data-set level permutation distance and data-set level attribute vari-
ances, it can be seen that the anonymized data set satisfies (d,v)-permuted
privacy with d = 1 and v = (0.01, 11.07, 30.26).
Obviously, the data protector, who has access to the entire original data
set and the entire anonymized data set, can verify as described in this section
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Table 3: Running example. Computation of the permutation distance for the
third original record x3 = (100.87, 902.21, 5108.54) of Table 2. The permutation
distance is d3 = max {4, 1, 4} = 4.
Y 1 Y 2 Y 3 (Y 1) (Y 2) (Y 3) d1 = |(Y 1)− 8| d2 = |(Y 2)− 2| d3 = |(Y 3)− 16| maxj dj
108.18 972.62 4876.73 14 7 5 6 5 11 11
96.60 1020.73 5005.04 6 11 13 2 9 3 9
105.26 882.92 4900.68 13 1 7 5 1 9 9
88.02 944.54 4949.78 2 4 10 6 2 6 6
91.57 1057.83 5267.57 5 18 19 3 16 3 16
100.41 991.34 5230.64 8 9 18 0 7 2 7
100.31 959.89 4824.03 7 5 4 1 3 12 12
123.37 1061.23 5450.70 20 19 20 12 17 4 17
103.12 903.25 4752.03 10 2 3 2 0 13 13
104.82 912.77 4997.61 12 3 12 4 1 4 4
87.83 1025.01 5166.63 1 12 17 7 10 1 10
112.21 1082.43 4988.44 15 20 11 7 18 5 18
114.29 988.93 4889.75 17 8 6 9 6 10 10
90.83 1049.58 4902.04 4 15 8 4 13 8 13
113.64 1002.19 5020.71 16 10 14 8 8 2 8
103.07 1052.03 4519.26 9 17 1 1 15 15 15
117.00 962.84 5087.90 19 6 16 11 4 0 11
89.43 1049.97 5072.79 3 16 15 5 14 1 14
115.79 1036.10 4662.73 18 13 2 10 11 14 14
104.00 1037.00 4931.99 11 14 9 3 12 7 12
whether the anonymized data set satisfies (d,v)-permuted privacy for any d
and v of his choice. The most interesting feature, however, is that each subject
can check whether (d,v)-permuted privacy with respect to her original record
is satisfied by the anonymized data set for some d and v of her choice. The
subject only needs to know her original record and the anonymized data set: for
example, the subject having contributed the third original record can compute
the permutation distance as described in Table 3 and also compute variances of
any subset of anonymized attribute values.
5 Intruder model in anonymization
There are some fundamental differences between data encryption and data
anonymization: whereas the receiver of the encrypted data has the key to de-
crypt the ciphertext back to plaintext, the user in anonymization has access only
to what plays the role of the ciphertext, that is, the anonymized data. Conse-
quently, while it makes sense to release encrypted data that disclose absolutely
nothing about the underlying plaintext (perfect secrecy, [25]), it does not make
sense to release anonymized data that disclose absolutely nothing about the
underlying original data. The objective of microdata release is to provide infor-
mation to the public, which means that some disclosure is inherently inevitable.
Even if data are anonymized prior to release, disclosure is still inevitable, be-
cause zero disclosure happens if and only if the anonymized data are completely
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Table 4: Running example. Minimum permutation distances, for each origi-
nal record (di for record i) and at the data set level (d). Closest anonymized
record (Y 1, Y 2, Y 3) to each original record (record no. is given in column yp).
Anonymized attribute variances within the data set-level minimum permuta-
tion distance d, for each original record (record rows) and at the data set level
(bottom row). Between parentheses, anonymized attribute variances for each
original record within the record-level permutation distance di (rather than d).
The anonymized data set turns out to satisfy (d,v)-permuted privacy with d = 1
and v = (0.01, 11.07, 30.26).
Rec # X1 X2 X3 Y 1 Y 2 Y 3 yp di V ar
1
i V ar
2
i V ar
3
i
1 103.69 981.80 4928.80 108.18 972.62 4876.73 1 4 0.48 (12.45) 69.14 (682.15) 388.07 (2170.53)
2 93.13 980.97 4931.16 96.60 1020.73 5005.04 2 4 6.57 (31.12) 69.14 (682.15) 388.07 (2170.53)
3 100.87 902.21 5108.54 105.26 882.92 4900.68 10 4 1.63 (24.70) 155.00 (896.76) 1692.52 (20167.78)
4 95.24 953.37 5084.18 88.02 944.54 4949.78 6 4 12.83 (32.47) 64.36 (1332.66) 1692.52 (20167.78)
5 96.18 1086.34 5212.25 91.57 1057.83 5267.57 5 2 12.83 (16.94) 112.36 (118.46) 1738.89 (14751.48)
6 93.16 986.70 5232.96 100.41 991.34 5230.64 6 3 6.57 (22.88) 69.14 (414.40) 1738.99(16208.14)
7 95.50 952.13 4824.95 100.31 959.89 4824.03 7 1 12.83 (12.83) 385.03 (385.03) 2612.38 (2612.38)
8 115.53 988.44 5437.43 123.37 1061.23 5450.70 17 4 1.23 (18.76) 69.14 (682.15) 8384.15 (2257.38)
9 98.99 941.48 4835.05 103.12 903.25 4752.03 7 1 3.14 (3.14) 385.03 (385.03) 2612.38 (3407.82)
10 109.96 984.87 4950.48 104.82 912.77 4997.61 13 4 8.12 (21.96) 69.14 (682.15) 555.30 (2952.80)
11 99.72 1005.19 5158.64 87.83 1025.01 5166.63 6 1 3.14 (3.14) 147.25 (147.25) 3407.82 (1676.76)
12 116.75 1057.63 4986.25 112.21 1082.43 4988.44 12 4 11.06 (13.03) 14.43 (169.01) 429.60 (1313.97)
13 107.62 1025.13 4954.28 114.29 988.93 4889.75 20 3 8.12 (16.70) 41.95 (359.80) 555.30 (2257.38)
14 87.62 1031.74 4905.71 90.83 1049.58 4902.04 14 3 0.01 (1.47) 29.73 (248.09) 208.80 (15949.39
15 109.81 971.09 4941.81 113.64 1002.19 5020.71 10 4 8.12 (21.96) 115.82 (937.01) 555.30 (95.84)
16 110.63 1052.34 4495.19 103.07 1052.03 4519.2 19 4 5.34 (22.74) 11.07 (190.00) 5145.91 (18406.42)
17 113.76 972.20 4893.50 117.00 962.84 5087.90 13 1 0.75 (0.75) 115.82 (115.82) 95.84 (95.84)
18 105.59 1027.64 5143.05 89.43 1049.97 5072.79 15 3 2.22 (14.82) 41.95 (359.80) 3407.82 (18406.42)
19 108.21 990.58 4714.76 115.79 1036.10 4662.73 1 2 8.12 (12.76) 33.26 (252.94) 4352.91 (15949.39)
20 104.74 1023.96 4900.79 104.00 1037.00 4931.99 20 2 0.27 (2.94) 41.95 (160.52) 30.26 (334.85)
Data set-level permutation distance d and variances V ar1, V ar2, V ar3 1 0.01 11.07 30.26
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useless, which makes the data release operation completely absurd. In fact, the
privacy-first approach to data anonymization runs this risk of absurdity when
too stringent privacy parameters are selected and enforced.
Another issue that complicates matters is that any user of anonymized
data could, potentially, be also an intruder. Hence, modeling the intruder in
anonymization is difficult since we have to consider many potential levels of
intruder’s knowledge. Fortunately, and in spite of the aforementioned funda-
mental differences, data encryption does offer some principles that remain useful
to tackle this characterization.
In cryptography, several different attack scenarios are distinguished depend-
ing on the intruder’s knowledge: ciphertext-only (the intruder only sees the
ciphertext), known-plaintext (the intruder has access to one or more pairs of
plaintext-ciphertext), chosen-plaintext (the intruder can choose any plaintext
and observe the corresponding ciphertext), chosen-ciphertext (the intruder can
choose any ciphertext and observe the corresponding plaintext).
In anonymization, we can equate the original data set to a plaintext and the
anonymized data set to a ciphertext. Hence, a ciphertext-only attack would be
one in which the intruder has access only to the anonymized data: this class of
attacks can be dangerous, as shown by [28] for de-identified DNA data, by [21]
for Netflix data and by [1] for the AOL data. Even if potentially dangerous,
assuming that the intruder only knows the anonymized data can be na¨ıve in
some situations. For example, if the intruder is one of the subjects in the data
set, he will normally know his own original record.
On the other hand, the strongest attacks in cryptography, namely chosen-
plaintext and chosen-ciphertext attacks, assume some interaction between the
intruder and the encryption system. Thus, they are not relevant in a non-
interactive anonymization setting such as the one we are considering (release of
anonymized data sets).
Hence, the strongest attack that anonymization of data sets must face is the
known-plaintext attack. In this attack, one might think of an intruder knowing
particular original records and their corresponding anonymized versions; how-
ever, this is unlikely, because anonymization precisely breaks the links between
anonymized records and corresponding original records. A more reasonable def-
inition for a known-plaintext attack in anonymization is the following.
Definition 3 (Known-plaintext attack in anonymization) An attack of this
class is one in which the intruder knows the entire original data set (plaintext)
and the entire corresponding anonymized data set (ciphertext), his objective
being to recreate the correct linkage between the original and the anonymized
records.
We observe that our definition of the intruder is stronger than any other
prior such definition in the data set anonymization scenario. One of the key
issues in modeling the intruder in this context is to define his prior knowledge,
including available background knowledge. As mentioned above, we assume
that the intruder has maximum knowledge: he knows X and Y, from which he
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can recreate Z by reverse mapping; hence, he only lacks the key, that is, the
correct linkage between X and Z. In particular, assuming knowledge of X by
the intruder eliminates the need to consider the presence/absence of external
background knowledge (typically external identified data sets linkable through
quasi-identifiers) when evaluating the ability of the intruder to disclose infor-
mation. In this respect, the intruder’s background knowledge is as irrelevant in
our intruder model as it is in ε-differential privacy.
As hinted above, knowledge of X allows our intruder to reverse-map Y to Z,
even if the data administrator only releases Y. Hence, using the permutation
paradigm of Section 3, we can say that the intruder is able to remove the noise
addition step in the functional equivalence of anonymization, so that he is only
confronted with permutation. In other words, if we consider that noise addition
is governed by one key (the random seed for the noise) and permutation by
another key (the random seed for the permutation), reverse mapping allows the
intruder to get rid of the former key and focus on the latter.
5.1 Record linkage computation by the intruder
The concept of record linkage has a long history in the disclosure limitation
literature. Many different record linkage procedures have been suggested and
two of the main procedures are distance-based record linkage and probabilistic
record linkage (see [29] for a discussion on them). Yet, one of the key aspects
affecting the success of record linkage is knowledge of the underlying procedure
used to anonymize the data. For example, if normally distributed noise is used
to mask the original data, then it has been shown that an optimal distance-based
record linkage can be performed [12]. But in other cases, it cannot be shown
that any particular record linkage method performs optimally. This results from
the simple fact that record linkage must be able to reverse the anonymization
procedure and, with a host of different anonymization procedures, this is a
challenging task.
From the perspective of our intruder, however, all anonymization procedures
are reduced to permutations of the original data. Thus, the best option to
guess which original record corresponds to which permuted record is to use the
above described permutation distance computation algorithm with the small
adaptation of replacing the anonymized data set Y by the permuted data set Z
in Algorithm 2. Note that we do not preclude the intruder from using some other
record linkage procedure and using Algorithm 2 for purposes of confirmation.
For the sake of illustration, Table 5 shows the linkages our intruder would
obtain when using Algorithm 2 on the X and Z data sets of our running example.
The following remarks are in order:
• For some records in X (record nos. 1, 9, 11 and 19), multiple matches are
obtained. For example, for the first original record, both the first and the
seventh permuted records are at shortest permutation distance.
• Some records in Z (record nos. 4, 7, 10, 12 and 13) are matches to multiple
records in X, whereas some records in Z (record nos. 3, 8, 16 and 18) are
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Table 5: Running example. Record linkages computed by the intruder. For each
original record in X (record no. specified in column #X), permuted records in
Z at shortest permutation distance (record no. (or nos.) specified in column
#Z). Both for X and Z, the values of record no. i can be found in the i-th row
of Table 2.
#X #Z dzi
1 1, 7 4
2 4 3
3 10 3
4 4 4
5 5 2
6 11 2
7 7 2
8 17 5
9 7, 9 3
10 15 3
11 2, 6 4
12 12 5
13 20 3
14 14 3
15 10 3
16 19 5
17 13 2
18 12 5
19 13, 19 4
20 20 3
matches to no record in X.
The intruder can realize the above, which diminishes his confidence in the ac-
curacy of the re-identification process.
Furthermore, it can be seen in Table 5 that 5 records are correctly linked, 4
records have multiple matches and the remaining 11 records are misidentified.
While the data protector can realize this, the intruder cannot tell with certainty
correct linkages from misidentifications, because he does not know the correct
linkages. The data protector may use the proportion of correct linkages as a
metric to evaluate the protection provided by anonymization.
5.2 Record linkage verification by the intruder
The inability of an intruder to assess the accuracy of re-identification via record
linkage is often viewed as providing plausible deniability to the data protector.
In other words, even if the intruder boasts the record linkages he has computed
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(something like Table 5), he cannot prove with certainty which linkages are
correct. Hence, any subject seeing that she has been correctly re-identified by
the intruder (e.g., the subject behind original record no. 4 in Table 5) could be
reassured by the data protector that re-identification has occurred by chance
alone without the intruder really being sure about it.
However, an intruder with the knowledge specified in Definition 3 can per-
form the analysis described in this section to verify how likely it is for his com-
puted record linkages to be correct. To do this, the intruder simply needs to
generate a random set of values by drawing from the original data and then
determine the permutation distance at which a match occurs from this random
data.
For instance, assume that the intruder randomly draws one value from X1,
another value from X2 (independent of the draw from X1), and a third value
from X3 (independent of the draws from X1 and X2). Assume that the first
draw yields the value of X1 in the fifth original record, the second draw the
value of X2 in the 19-th original record and the third draw the value of X3
in the 10-th original record. The synthetic record formed by the intruder is
a = (x15, x
2
19, x
3
10) = (96.18, 990.58, 4950.48). This record does not exist in the
original data set X. But even for this synthetic record there is some permutation
distance at which the intruder is likely to find a matching record in Z. When the
permutation distance computation algorithm is used for this synthetic record, a
match is found at distance 2 and the matched record in Z is the second record
(96.18, 988.44, 4986.25) (see the records of Z in Table 2).
Given that the size of our running example is small, the intruder can perform
the above analysis (computing the permutation distance of the match in Z) for
all possible 8000 (= 203) records resulting from three random draws. Let A be
the data set containing these 8000 possible records. Within A, 20 records are
the original records in X, 20 the permuted records in Z, and the remaining are
actual synthetic records. Hence, for the 20 records in Z, a match in A would be
found at a permutation distance of zero. Table 6 shows the distribution of the
permutation distance for the 20 original records in X and for the 8000 possible
records in A. Figure 1 is a graphical representation of both distributions.
Both Table 6 and Figure 1 highlight that the probability of finding a match
at a particular permutation distance for an original record in X is quite similar
to the probability of finding a match at the same permutation distance for a
random record in A. Otherwise put, when a matching record is found for an
original record in X, there is a high probability that the match occurred by
chance alone. Hence, upon seeing Table 6 and/or Figure 1, the intruder realizes
that he cannot claim success in his record linkages because they are not reliable.
In conclusion, the anonymization withstands a known-plaintext attack as per
Definition 3. And, since the intruder of Definition 3 has maximum knowledge,
the anonymized data are also safe from record linkage by any other intruder.
As Figure 1 illustrates, for a very small data set (such as the one in our
running example), even a small level of permutation is likely to prevent the
intruder from claiming success with re-identification. Note that random matches
occur already at distances 0, 1, 2, etc., so short-distance matches actually due
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Table 6: Running example. Distributions of the permutation distance of the
match in Z for the set X of 20 original records and for the set A of the 8000
possible records that can be obtained by respective random draws from X1, X2
and X3.
Distance Frequency Frequency
d for X for A
0 0.0000 0.0025
1 0.0000 0.0586
2 0.2000 0.1899
3 0.4000 0.3014
4 0.2000 0.2595
5 0.2000 0.1288
6 0.0000 0.0428
7 0.0000 0.0143
8 0.0000 0.0024
9 0.0000 0.0000
10 0.0000 0.0000
Figure 1: Running example. Graphical representation of the distributions of the
permutation distance of the match in Z for the set X of 20 original records and
for the set A of the 8000 possible records that can be obtained by respective
random draws from X1, X2 and X3.
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to small anonymization permutation are plausible as random matches. This
need not be the case with larger data sets: if the number of records or the
number of attributes are greater, then random matches at short distances may
be extremely rare or even non-existing, in which case short-distance matches
due to small permutation are no longer plausible as random matches. Hence,
anonymizing with a small level of permutation may not suffice for larger data
sets.
For the sake of illustration, consider an original data set X with 1000 records
randomly generated in the same way as the original data set in our running
example. We first use perturbation through additive noise with the same char-
acteristics as the one used in our running example and we get an anonymized
data set Y. Then the intruder reverse-maps Y to get Z. While it would still
be feasible to generate all potential combinations of values from X (10003), for
purposes of computational efficiency, we assume the intruder generates a data
set A with 10, 000 synthetic records by randomly and independently selecting
values from attributes X1, X2 and X3. Figure 2 depicts the distributions of the
permutation distance for the original records (in X) and for the random records
(in A). It turns out that both distributions are practically indistinguishable.
So, we are in a similar situation as in Figure 1, although the permutation dis-
tances are much larger in Figure 2. Hence, if the intruder were to find a match,
there is a high probability that the match could have occurred at random. We
can conclude that the anonymization procedure used to obtain Y withstands a
known-plaintext attack.
In contrast, consider now the same data set X with 1000 records, but assume
that the noise added to get the anonymized data Y is very small. Specifically,
the noise E1 is sampled from a N(0, 0.052), the noise E2 added to X2 from a
N(0, 0.252) and the noise E3 added to X3 from a N(0, 1). Figure 3 and Table 7
show the distributions of the permutation distance for the original records (in
X) and for the random records (in A).
From Table 7, a match that occurs at a permutation distance of 0 must be
a correct match: that is, the noise added to anonymize was so small that it did
not result in re-ordering any of the attributes. Table 7 also shows that there is
only a probability 0.0011 (roughly 1 over 1000) that a match is random given
that its permutation distance is ≤ 5. In fact, comparing the distributions of the
permutation distance of matches for the original data and the random data is an
excellent tool for the intruder to verify on a record by record basis how accurate
his record linkages are. Given the very little overlap of the distributions shown
in Figure 3, the intruder can conclude that his matches are very likely to be
correct ones. In this case, the anonymization procedure fails to withstand a
known-plaintext attack.
The above assessment by the intruder can also be made by the data pro-
tector before releasing the data, in order to determine the optimum amount of
permutation that anonymization should introduce.
The distribution of the permutation distance for the original values in X is a
direct function only of the level of anonymization —the higher the modification
introduced by anonymization, the longer the permutation distance. The distri-
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Figure 2: Original data set X with 1000 records anonymized by adding N(0, 52)
noise to X1, N(0, 252) noise to X2 and N(0, 1002) to X3. Graphical represen-
tation of the distributions of the permutation distance of the match in Z for X
and for a set A of 10, 000 random records obtained respective and independent
random draws from X1, X2 and X3.
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Figure 3: Original data set X with 1000 records anonymized by adding
N(0, 0.052) noise to X1, N(0, 0.252) noise to X2 and N(0, 1) to X3. Graphical
representation of the distributions of the permutation distance of the match
in Z for X and for a set A of 10, 000 random records obtained respective and
independent random draws from X1, X2 and X3.
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Table 7: Original data set X with 1000 records anonymized by adding
N(0, 0.052) noise to X1, N(0, 0.252) noise to X2 and N(0, 1) to X3. Distri-
butions of the permutation distance of the match in Z for X and for a set A
of 10, 000 random records obtained respective and independent random draws
from X1, X2 and X3.
Distance Frequency Frequency
d for X for A
0 0.0270 0.0000
1 0.2670 0.0000
2 0.2650 0.0001
3 0.2090 0.0002
4 0.1170 0.0005
5 0.0550 0.0003
6 0.0330 0.0006
7 0.0170 0.0013
8 0.0040 0.0012
9 0.0050 0.0019
10 0.0000 0.0028
11 0.0000 0.0027
12 0.0010 0.0032
13 0.0000 0.0032
14 0.0000 0.0054
≥ 15 0.0000 0.9766
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bution of the permutation distance for random records grows with the number
of records, grows with the number of attributes and, by construction, it is in-
dependent of the anonymization method and level of anonymization used (the
random data set contains all possible permutations of the original records or a
random large subset of them). A comprehensive discussion of the exact charac-
teristics of the distribution of the permutation distance is beyond the scope of
this paper.
To the best of our knowledge, ours is the first attempt to present a principled
algorithm for the intruder to evaluate the effectiveness of the re-identification
process. Prior assessment of re-identification could only be carried out by the
data protector and it only focused on the percentage of misidentifications and
the percentage of multiple matches (in line with the analysis made in the last
paragraph of Section 5.1 above). Further developments may allow the intruder
to assess the extent to which the two distributions are different (by using mea-
sures such as Hellinger’s distance) or develop formal statistical tools by treating
the distribution of the match distance for the random records as the distribution
of the statistic under the null hypothesis in hyphotesis testing.
Finally, note that when the anonymization method involves only permuta-
tion without noise addition (which is the case with data swapping [3] and data
shuffling [19]), a data subject with access to just her own record in X can not
only learn the permutation distance d of her record (as described in Section 4),
but she can also verify whether d is safe. To this end, the subject generates
A from the masked data Z (Z can be used instead of X, because one data set
is a permutation of the other) and then checks whether a match at distance d
is plausible as a random match; if yes, then d is safe. One may assume that
the data protector has checked that the permutation distance of all records is
safe, but giving each subject the possibility to check it is an attractive feature
of pure-permutation anonymization.
6 Anonymization transparency towards the user
In this section, we discuss the user in the context of the permutation-paradigm
of anonymization presented in Section 3. There is one tenet from data encryp-
tion that can be usefully applied to data anonymization: Kerckhoff’s principle,
which states that the encryption algorithm must be entirely public, with the
key being the only secret parameter. Nowadays, statistical agencies and other
data releasers often refrain from publishing the parameters used in anonymiza-
tion (variance of the added noise, proximity of swapped values, group size in
microaggregation, etc.). The exception is when the privacy-first approach is
used (based on a privacy model), in which case the anonymization parameters
are explicit and dictated by the model. However, as mentioned above, most real
data releases are anonymized under the utility-first approach. Withholding the
parameters of anonymization is problematic for at least two reasons:
1. The legitimate user cannot properly evaluate the utility of the anonymized
data.
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2. Basing disclosure protection on the secrecy of the anonymization algo-
rithm and its parameterization is a poor idea, as it is hard to keep that
much information secret and it is better to expose algorithms and param-
eterizations to public scrutiny to detect any weaknesses in them.
One might argue that the parameters of an anonymization method play the
role of the key in cryptography and must therefore be withheld. We contend
that this is a wrong notion, because whereas cryptographic keys are randomly
chosen, anonymization parameters are not (there are typical values for noise
variance, etc.). The most similar thing to a cryptographic key in the context of
anonymization are the random seeds used by (pseudo-)randomized anonymiza-
tion methods.
It is also important to note that Kerckhoff’s principle is of no consequence to
the intruder modeled according to cryptographic principles. According to our
definition of the intruder, the anonymization method and the level of anonymiza-
tion play no role in the re-identification process. Once the intruder has per-
formed reverse mapping, the only remaining unknown is the random key used
for permuting the values. And we have shown how the intruder can best guess the
permutation used (Section 5.1) and then evaluate the accuracy of his guess with-
out any information about the anonymization mechanism (Section 5.2). Hence,
for our intruder, the claim that following Kerckhoff’s principle will result in
increased disclosure risk is incorrect. Actually, following Kerckhoff’s principle
harms none of the stakeholders in the microdata release (data protector, sub-
ject, intruder and user) and it is extremely valuable for the user. For these
reasons, we believe that the data protector must always release details about
the anonymization methods and parameters used. We formalize this notion in
Definition 4.
Definition 4 (Anonymization transparency to the data user) An anonymiza-
tion method is said to be transparent to the data user when the user is given
all details of the anonymization except the random seed(s) (if any are used for
pseudo-randomization).
7 Conclusions and future research
We have presented a new vision of microdata anonymization that opens several
new directions.
First, we have shown how knowledge of the values of the original attribute
allows reverse mapping the values of the anonymized attribute into a permuta-
tion of the original attribute values. This holds for any anonymization method
and for any attribute whose values can be ranked (and in fact any data are
amenable to some sort of ranking). Hence, any anonymization method can be
viewed as a permutation followed by a (small) noise addition. This vision ap-
plies to any anonymization method and it allows easily comparing methods in
terms of the data utility and the privacy they provide.
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Based on the permutation plus noise paradigm, we have stated a new privacy
model, called (d,v)-permuted privacy, that focuses on the minimum permuta-
tion distance achieved and on the variance of the attribute values within that
distance. The advantage of this privacy model with respect to previous meth-
ods in the literature is that it is not only verifiable by the data protector, but
also by each data subject having contributed a record to the original data set
(subject-verifiability).
Then we have precisely defined a maximum-knowledge adversarial model in
anonymization. Specifically, we have shown how our intruder can best guess
the permutation achieved by an anonymization method and how he can as-
sess the quality of his guess. The intruder’s assessment is independent of the
anonymization method used and it also tells the data protector the right level
of permutation needed to protect against re-identification.
Regarding the data user, we have argued why Kerckhoff’s assumption should
be the rule in anonymization, just as it is the rule in encryption. Releasing the
details of anonymization introduces no weakness and it is extremely useful to
the user. This calls for anonymization that is transparent to the user.
We have illustrated the concepts and procedures introduced throughout the
paper with a running example.
This paper opens a great number of future research lines. These include the
following:
• Extend the reverse-mapping conversion of Algorithm 1 for any type of
attribute (that is, nominal in addition to numerical or ordinal).
• Explore the consequences of the permutation paradigm of anonymization
for local perturbation methods.
• Regarding the adversarial model, rigorously characterize the distribution
of the permutation distance and tackle the issues sketched at the end of
Section 5.2.
• In line with the cryptography-inspired model of anonymization, seek information-
theoretic measures of anonymity focused on the mapping between the orig-
inal and anonymized records output by a specific anonymization method.
• Produce an inventory of anonymization methods in the literature that
are transparent to the data user according to Definition 4. In particular,
investigate to what extent deterministic methods (using no randomness
seeds, e.g., microaggregation, coarsening, etc.) can be transparent.
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